Competing propagandas: How the United States and Russia represent mutual propaganda activities

The definition of propaganda has been contested by many. Propaganda theorist Harold Lasswell’s (1927: 4) negative portrayal describes ‘the management of opinions and attitudes by the direct manipulation’. Yet negative definitions offer limited analytical clarity, since the term is often used simply to dismiss the opponent’s point of view. In this article, we adopt Taylor’s (2003: 7) neutral definition of propaganda as ‘a process by which an idea or an opinion is communicated to someone else for a specific persuasive purpose’. With a neutral definition, the ethics of a propaganda strategy consider the methods used, the desired and actual outcomes, and whose interests it is intended to serve.

PD is one tool governments traditionally use for extending international influence and advancing foreign policy objectives by engaging with foreign publics. PD took off when the United States sought to replace the term ‘propaganda’ for describing its foreign population influence, to distinguish US propaganda activities from those used in Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union (see Cull, 2006). While PD and propaganda overlap, not least in their purpose of serving a country’s interests through influencing public opinion, and some consider propaganda an umbrella term which embraces PD and other tools (Briant, 2015b), others have tried to differentiate PD as ‘persuasion by means of dialogue’ and more open to listening to and engaging audiences (Melissen, 2005: 18). As Brown (2008) has put it, ‘the best public diplomacy achieves credibility through careful presentation of fact and thoughtful argumentation, while the worst propaganda achieves credibility by falsification and sensationalism’. Towards the 2000s, PD became more popular internationally, particularly during the War on Terror (Briant, 2015b) and amid increased political attention to the concept of soft power (Nye, 2004). Gregory (2008) defines PD as a political instrument, which is ‘used by states, associations of states, and nonstate actors to understand cultures, attitudes, and behavior; build and manage relationships; and influence opinions and actions to advance interests and values’. PD involves impact on public opinion in other countries by means beyond traditional diplomacy, such as intercultural communication and exchanges, cultural diplomacy, advocacy, and international broadcasting (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2012), with the aim of ‘increasing awareness, managing reputations, changing legislation or altering attitudes’ (Simons, 2014: 441). More recently, the spread of social media has given rise to ‘Public Diplomacy 2.0’, which includes new communication channels and strategies (Cull, 2013).

International broadcasting is an important part of PD strategies, as it involves ‘the use of electronic media by one society to shape the opinion of the people and leaders of another’ (Price, 2003: 53). PD media help deliver messages and images to foreign publics to the advantage of an international actor. As Rawnsley (2015) argues, the success of PD media depends on finding the balance between being seen to provide professional journalism and trustworthy news on one hand and advancing the interests of the state they represent on the other. The configurations, outputs, and impact of PD media therefore involve the wider context of media systems and how societies understand the role of journalism.

The United States and Russia present a case of two major international actors with conflicting political interests, a long history of mutual propaganda activities, and considerably different media systems. Relations between the United States and Russia, particularly following the Ukraine crisis and 2016 US presidential election, have been marked by increased tensions, expanded propaganda efforts, and falling public trust in journalism and democratic politics. Accusations of ‘fake news’, digital interference, ‘computational propaganda’ (Woolley and Howard, 2017), and strategic hacking underlie widespread calls for the state and media organizations to respond to the new ‘post-truth politics’ (see Hutchings, 2017). US responses have included investment in PD, blacklists of ‘fake news’ websites, removal of disinformation from social media, a new National Cyber Strategy, registration of Russian state-run media as ‘foreign agents’, and debates on new state bills that would aim to improve public media literacy. Russia has restricted foreign ownership of media, passed new laws on countering ‘fake news’ and misinformation, increased investment in its own PD media, and similarly introduced a ‘foreign agents’ list. However, propaganda and PD configurations differ considerably between the US and Russian systems, including their domestic and foreign contexts, the role of the state, media protections and restrictions, and target audiences.

Concerns about ‘propaganda’, ‘fake news’, and misinformation have been named a matter of national security and a priority in foreign policy in both Russia and the United States in recent years. The threat is formulated similarly in both US and Russian documents, as foreign influence that undermines stability, national interests, and civil/democratic society. However, the source of threat and its perceived target or victim are formulated differently.

US documents suggest that ‘disinformation and other propaganda . . . undermine the national security objectives’, cause a ‘destabilizing effect on United States allies and interests’ (H.R.5181), ‘undermine faith in the US Government and fuel political protest’ (Intelligence Community Assessment, 2017), and ‘sow discord in our democratic processes’ (National Cyber Strategy, 2018). Propaganda is situated externally, as ‘foreign misinformation’ and ‘foreign propaganda’ (including in the title of H.R.5181 Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act) and as ‘malign foreign influence operations’ (National Cyber Strategy, 2018). ‘Foreign propaganda’ is frequently assigned to particular countries, for example, Russia and China (H.R.5181). National Cyber Strategy (2018) directly blames Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, along with nonstate actors such as terrorist networks, for conducting ‘reckless cyber attacks . . . to profit, recruit, propagandize’ as a way to ‘challenge the United States, its allies, and partners’. The target of external propaganda and disinformation is conceptualized in the language of foreign policy and existing alliances: as the ‘US and Western governments’ or the ‘US and key allies and partners’ (Intelligence Community Assessment, 2017). The overall understanding of propaganda in US policy documents is that of a tool of foreign state and nonstate influence against the West that threatens national interests and security.

Russian documents portray propaganda as threatening to ‘destabilize the internal political and social situation’, exert ‘information pressure on the population, primarily on the Russian youth . . . to erode Russian traditional spiritual and moral values’ (Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, 2016), and create ‘possibilities for mass violations of public order or public security’ (Federal Law on Amending Article 15-3, 2019). The reference to youth is important: mobilizing on social media, it was a noticeable group behind Russian protests in 2011 to 2013, 2017, and 2019, while the Kremlin has devoted increasing attention to establishing pro-governmental youth organizations and pushing for ‘patriotic upbringing’ and education (Hemment, 2015; Khvostunova, 2019). ‘Information pressure’ from abroad presents youth discontent as external manipulation and a matter of security and sovereignty. Other propaganda threats include the more general spreading of ‘information which negatively influences civil society’ (Mass Media Law, 2013) and undermining Russia’s ‘information security’ and ‘stability’ (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016). ‘Foreign’ in Russian documents is used to denote the externality of communications, misinformation, and target audiences, but with no indication of locations or countries. The Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation (2016) speaks of ‘certain states’ and ‘a number of foreign countries’ trying to ‘undermine the Russian Federation and its allies’; yet, the external threat remains faceless and broadly defined. Instead, the origin and target of propaganda can be anywhere: Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (2016) speaks of a ‘global information space’ where information becomes increasingly exposed to manipulation. The document names cyber security and addressing ‘threats involving the use of information and communication technology’ among Russia’s foreign policy priorities.

PD media closely echo formulations of threat found in the official documents. RFE/RL sees the purpose of Russian propaganda in ‘undermining the U.S. electoral system’, ‘meddl[ing] in the democratic process’, ‘openly agitating for a US election candidate’, ‘creating a crescent of instability’, ‘destabilizing the West itself’, turning ‘Western democracy into a weapon against Western democracy’, ‘spreading Euroscepticism and anti-Americanism’, ‘crystallizing anti-establishment ideas’, ‘deliberately mislead[ing] and inflam[ing] television audiences’, and ‘divert[ing] attention’ from Russia’s breaking international norms. Russian-language RFE/RL similarly accused Russian PD media of ‘trying to split the West’; ‘spreading fake news’ that is picked up by US right-wing media; ‘corrupting local politicians, journalists, and public opinion leaders’; and weaponizing and ‘sabotaging information’. These threats speak to both external and internal target audiences: they validate rising nationalist/military rhetoric in Eastern Europe about Russia’s ‘destabilization of the West’ and at the same time explain Western popular discontent with their political and economic elites (‘anti-establishment ideas’) as RT’s encouragement of Brexit, Trump, and Le Pen supporters to seek radical change. The major aim of foreign propaganda, according to RFE/RL, is inherently (geo)political – an ‘attempt to fragment internally our societies, perhaps distort our political processes, and to sow discontent and a lack of cohesion across the allies’ (RFE/RL, 2016a). This is also an activity in which Russia is portrayed as (geo)politically isolated: ‘Russia’s powerful propaganda campaign is alarming the rest of the world’ (RFE/RL, 2016b, emphasis added). The narrative of a morally isolated neo-Soviet autocracy and America leading the ‘free world’ is also dominant in domestic US mainstream media (Tsygankov, 2017).

RT was much less specific about threats posed by Western propaganda activities to the Russian national audience. Instead, it portrayed Western media coverage as threatening Western populations with uncertainty and deception: ‘Whatever Russian news media are accused of regarding fake news it is incomparable to the massive, systematic scale of fabrications and distortions churned out by the news media in NATO member countries’ (RT, 2017a). RT highlighted contradictions between media and government statements on several US officials’ alleged ties to Russian interests during the Mueller investigation. After the release of the Mueller Report, RT represented ‘Trump/Russia hoax’ and Putin’s negative image in the United States as ‘slick propaganda for the [American] masses’. It is not surprising that RT portrayed propaganda as a threat to Western rather than Russian national audiences, as RT’s target audience is in the West. RFE/RL’s application of propaganda threats mostly to Western publics and democracy may be more surprising since its main target audience is in Eastern Europe. Yet while it was the West who appeared under threat, RFE/RL transmitted an image of Russia as an isolated perpetrator – an unstable state ‘founded on corruption and deceitful propaganda’ (RFE/RL, 2019a) – and thus supported oppositional voices within the country.

The construction of propaganda threats between Russian and US documents and media is similar in two important aspects. First, propaganda is portrayed as a threat to the state (and its international standing) through society. Society that has been ‘corrupted’ by propaganda itself can become a source of danger, as seen in the representations of Russian youth and Western anti-establishment sentiments. Second, by justifying internal problems as external, the state is portrayed as the entity that can (and is called upon to) provide security as a matter of defence – an important consideration in how the emerging response is framed.

Russian and American documents and PD media assert widespread use of propaganda by external powers in pursuit of national interest but devote surprisingly little attention to questioning its actual real-world impacts. In our sample, the opponent’s propaganda is claimed to jeopardize national security, societal cohesion, and state stability in many ways, but the power of external agents to successfully deliver these threats and manipulate public opinion is usually only assumed. An impression of propaganda as all-powerful and effective is communicated through language that portrays propaganda threats as omnipresent and imagines audiences as uncritical and disempowered recipients of information.

The language of PD media and official documents in both countries widely utilizes metaphors to describe propaganda activities. These are mostly scientific and technology related (describing propaganda as ‘operation’, ‘technology’, ‘machine’, ‘mechanism’, ‘technology’, ‘tool’) or war related (involving ‘adversaries’, ‘attacks’, ‘escalations’, ‘aggression’, ‘deterrence’, ‘detection’, ‘battlefield’, ‘firing broadsides’, ‘sabotage’). Metaphors create feelings and emotions (Charteris-Black, 2011), in this case contributing to the impression of propaganda as unknown and sophisticated power beyond an average person’s comprehension, and as a conflict in which citizens inevitably turn to the state for protection. Facelessness of a threat multiplies its potential agents, making the threat seem omnipresent and the audience powerless to avoid it. This makes enemy constructions more appealing, as they can attribute faceless threats to certain, known, even if feared objects (see Chernobrov, 2019).

The framing of audiences as incapable of recognizing and fighting propaganda is a common thread in RFE/RL and RT coverage. Both media rarely detail the effect of propaganda on the public or discuss how it might be addressed without recourse to state control. When audiences are mentioned, it is usually to contrast the powerlessness of the public against the capabilities of the government. RT (2017b), for example, suggests that ‘people can’t defend themselves’ against propaganda; therefore, ‘we need government responsibility’ and more education. RFE/RL (2016b) closely echoes this view, depicting populations who ‘cannot filter’ information and therefore cannot be held responsible for falling victim to propaganda.

The effect on audiences is assumed throughout Russian and US policy documents to be vast and unobstructed, with audiences playing passive roles of information recipients and easily manipulated objects. Mere exposure to propaganda is assumed to be enough to cause suitable perception and behaviour (persuade citizens to engage in protest, disrupt stability, vote differently). A number of media literacy initiatives in the United States point at the public’s frequent failure to distinguish between sponsored content and news stories, particularly online (see Media Literacy Now, n.d.). The assumption of vast propaganda power is reminiscent of the ‘third person effect’ in psychology (Davison, 1983), where others are assumed to be easily influenced whereas oneself is affected less or not at all. The only attempt to evidence effect on audiences in both countries’ policy documents is made in Intelligence Community Assessment (2017) and is numerical as it presumes that large audience size or its increase imply belief in the message: ‘RT’s most popular English language video about the President-elect . . . featured Assange and had 2.2 million views’; ‘RT recently was the most-watched foreign news channel in the UK’; ‘RT had the most rapid growth . . . audience in New York tripled and in Washington DC grew by 60%’ (emphasis added). The same approach is used to measure the influence of American PD media abroad (see Broadcasting Board of Governors, 2017).

Yet, the numbers alone can be misleading. RT’s reach and persuasive power are likely exaggerated by RT itself, through bots and social media algorithms (Woolley and Howard, 2017) and by those invested in portraying Russia as a threat. While RT claims to be among the top 5 pan-European news channels (RT, n.d.), Broadcasters’ Audience Research Board (2017) ratings for UK viewership remain low, and some assert that RT’s only tangible success is in selected Arab countries (Zavadski, 2015). Moreover, RT’s most popular YouTube videos are unrelated to politics (Zavadski, 2015), making it hard to estimate political influence. Pomerantsev (2014) states that the network’s popularity stems not from overt propaganda but from ‘other’ news. For example, RT was nominated for the International Emmy Award for their coverage of Barack Obama’s visit to Russia, the Occupy movement, and Guantanamo Bay Hunger Strikes.

Many scholars note difficulty in measuring propaganda effect and influence (see Miskimmon et al., 2014; Pamment, 2012; Zaller, 1996), and assumptions of impact on public opinion from mere exposure, audience size, or number of views have also been criticized (Ladd and Lenz, 2009; Shrum, 2009). Yet such limitations of measuring effect rarely enter public or political discourse. Propaganda, particularly with digital technology, has become a ‘fetish’ that drives a large industry for public relations (PR) contractors in defence (Awan et al., 2019). The focus on ‘outputs rather than impacts’ (Rawnsley, 2015) drives investment in state-sponsored solutions in both Russia and the United States. Sense of threat has been linked to the ‘escalation of patriotic sentiment’ (van der Toorn et al., 2014: 21), which may explain increased public support for national security investment.

Both Russia and the United States contrast their own PD efforts against the opponent’s propaganda threat. Among the US documents, the International Communications Reform Act of 2015 (HR 2323) and the Intelligence Community Assessment (2017) draw a clear self/other comparison. American PD broadcasters are described as a ‘reliable source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news’ (H.R.2323). Combined with the emphasis on ‘foreign propaganda’, this description further externalizes propaganda as a practice and strengthens claims the US only disseminates ‘fact-based narratives’. Foreign PD media – RT in particular – are described as a ‘state-run propaganda machine’. Lexically, RT is represented negatively with words, ‘rapid expansion’, ‘candid statements’, ‘conquer the audience’, ‘fuel discontent’, ‘aggressively advertise’, ‘avoid regulations’ (Intelligence Community Assessment, 2017).

Russian documents see the role of Russian PD media in ‘information support for foreign policy activities’, which includes ‘delivery to the international community of unbiased information about Russia’s perspective on key international issues, its foreign policy initiatives and efforts’ (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016). The Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation (2016) similarly names ‘providing the Russian and international community with reliable information’ as the ‘national interest in the information sphere’. The documents do not call these activities propaganda but describe Russia’s actions as ‘develop[ing] its own effective ways to influence foreign audiences’ in an attempt to ensure ‘the right of every person to access unbiased information and various points of view’ (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016). Russia’s own information activities are portrayed as a positive influence, as opposed to the ‘negative influence’ from external threats (Mass Media Law, 2013). Yet unlike the United States, Russian documents explicitly connect ‘unbiased information’ with the state perspective – an approach which echoes RT’s mission and Russia’s understanding of both media roles and ‘soft power [as] an integral part of efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives’ (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016).

Our PD media sample showed that both RFE/RL and RT blamed the other for being state-funded, while portraying itself as independent and objective. RFE/RL called RT a ‘state-backed Russian channel’ and ‘a pillar of a Kremlin campaign to meddle in the [US] presidential election’. This was contrasted against RFE/RL’s self-description as ‘an independent corporation funded by the U.S. Congress. The U.S. government is not involved in its operational or editorial decisions’ (RFE/RL, 2017). Besides independence, RFE/RL praised itself for ‘accurate’ and ‘fearless reporting’, despite ‘relentless intimidation and threats by Russian security forces’, particularly in the coverage of Russia’s actions in the Crimea (RFE/RL, 2019b).

RT created a similar contrast: ‘RFE/RL is among the oldest state-funded media outlets in the world’ (RT, 2017c). RT repeatedly described itself as autonomous and non-commercial news media, ‘singled out lately by the US intelligence’ for ‘presenting valid alternative perspectives on a range of international issues’ and being ‘basically independent, doing things differently’. RT belittled and deflected propaganda accusations in line with its ‘Question More’ slogan: good journalism would always be victimized because of challenging elite interests, and true propaganda is in the other’s attempts to avoid uncomfortable questions. In turn, RFE/RL accused Russia’s media of not seeing the difference between journalism and propaganda (RFE/RL, 2014).

Both RT and RFE/RL constructed a victimized narrative of professional journalism on the defence. However, while RT portrayed itself and Russia under attack, it maintained an image of journalistic and national strength and resilience – directly relating to how Russia sees its international role as a challenger to US hegemony. In RFE/RL’s reporting, the West appeared passive, uncertain, and unprepared for foreign propaganda, despite heavy spending on information warfare and PD post-9/11. Yet, instead of presenting a vice, these qualities were built into a narrative of virtuous democratic vulnerability – the West as a leader who should expect to be challenged and as a priori vulnerable because it is pluralist and diverse, and because propaganda and deception are taking new, digital, unexpected, ever penetrating forms. RFE/RL spoke of the ‘West suffering from one of its worst crises of confidence’, ‘getting increasingly nervous’, and having ‘an air of helplessness’, and reported calls to take a more decisive stance, ‘to ensure no foreign meddling in the [next] election’. PD media representations of self/other propaganda activities therefore resonate with how Russia and the United States position themselves in the international system, intertwining with their other strategic narratives and discursive constructions of hierarchy in world politics.